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Executive Summary  
 
The outbreak of the global financial crisis, the fluctuation of commodity prices, and the economic 
slowdown of the major trading partners in 2008 and the early 2009 has brought about one of the 
most difficult challenges to lower-income economies in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS, i.e. 
Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia) since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. Foreign trade, 
including both export and import, severely declined, leading to serious contraction of economic 
growth.    
This research seeks to better understand the impacts of the global economic crisis on Vietnam’s 
foreign trade and policy responses, and from this, draw inferences for Lao PDR and Cambodia. To 
this aim, it asks the following questions: 
  To what extent was the foreign trade of Vietnam affected by the global economic 
crisis? 
  What were the policies by the Vietnamese government to arrest and reverse the 
decline in foreign trade?   
  What lessons can the Vietnamese experience offer to Lao PDR and Cambodia?   
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1. Introduction  
The six economies of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) include Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, Viet Nam (CLMV), Thailand and China’s Yunnan Province. In the recent years,  GMS 
countries have achieved remarkable success in their economic development and integration at both 
the sub-regional and global level. In 2001, China acceded to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), followed by Cambodia in 2004 and Vietnam in 2006. At the same time, a dense web of 
sub-regional cooperation has been created, including the establishment of development triangles, 
opening of economic corridors, implementation of cross-border trade facilitation measures, and the 
acceleration of the completion of the ASEAN Free Trade Area by CLMV on their way toward 
membership in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).   
At the same time, trade has been expanding faster than ever in the GMS. During the 1994-2006 
period, intra-GMS exports, excluding those to China, grew at an annual average rate of 19% 
(People’s Daily Online, 31/3/2008). From 2002 to 2006, total trade turnover between Cambodia 
and Thailand increased from US$ 259.88 million to US$ 411.29 million (Chanboreth, 2009). Trade 
with neighboring economies is especially important for Lao PDR and Myanmar. Lao PDR, for 
example, being a land-locked country, depends heavily on intra-regional trade, with 45% of its 
exports going to and 72% of its imports coming from the GMS in 2008. U.S economic sanctions 
have made Thailand and China Myanmar’s two largest trading partners. Myanmar’s trade with 
China, for instance, has grown steadily since the late 1980s, constituting 24% of its total foreign 
trade in 2008 (Pichai, 2009). In 2008, before the impact of the global economic crisis was fully 
felt, trade turnover of Vietnam with China, Lao PDR and Cambodia grew at the rates of 37.6%, 
35.6% and 27.3% respectively compared to 2007 (MOIT, 2009).     
The outbreak of the global financial crisis, fluctuations in oil, food, and other commodity prices, 
and the economic slowdown of the major trading partners in 2008 and early 2009 has brought 
about one of the most difficult challenges to the GMS economies since the Asian financial crisis of 
1997-1998. The most important impact channel, exports, was severely decreased, leading to a 
serious contraction of economic growth. Among the lower income economies of the GMS, in 
2009, the export volume of Vietnam fell 9.7%, contributing to a further decline of the economic 
growth rate from 6.18% in 2008 to 5.32% in 2009 (General Statistics Office, Annual Report 2009). 
Cambodian total exports showed a sharp decline of 18% compared to 2008, and the growth rate 
fell to 2.1% from 6.6% in 2008 (The Mirror, 21/1/2010). The relatively closed economy of Lao 
PDR also experienced a fall in its growth rate from 7.2% in 2008 to 6.4% in 2009 because of 
heavy drop in the price of its major export items. (Vientiane Times, 25/1/2010) 
The above governments took important steps on both fiscal and monetary policy in response to the 
impacts of the crisis: Stimulus packages were launched; central banks reduced interest rates; fiscal 
authorities adopted expansionary policies; taxes were cut; and targeted cash transfers were made. 
These varied from country to country depending on their fiscal capabilities, but at least a few of 
these measures were taken in every case. Moreover, it became a popular view during the period of 
external economic turbulence that the more open is the economy, the more severe the impact. The 
adverse effects of the global economic crisis on foreign trade and economic growth have ushered 
in calls for the export-oriented developing economies to rebalance their growth sources by   2
choosing their domestic market for their own production (Kawai, 2009; Kuroda, 2009; Nag, 2009). 
Although this idea is correct and indeed timely, it may unconsciously provide a rationale for an 
increase in protectionism and the return to past import-substitution trade policies in these countries 
in the aftermath of the crisis.   
This research seeks to better understand the impacts of the global economic crisis on Vietnam’s 
foreign trade and policy responses, and from this, draw conclusions for Lao PDR and Cambodia. 
To this aim, it asks the following questions: 
  To what extent was foreign trade of Vietnam affected by the global economic 
crisis? 
  What were the policies by the Vietnamese government to arrest and reverse the 
decline in foreign trade?   
  What lessons can Vietnam offer to Lao PDR and Cambodia for mutual advantages?  
The rest of this paper is organized into 5 sections. The following section provides an overview of 
the impacts of the global financial crisis upon the Vietnamese economy, and discusses some key 
literature on the impact of the crisis on Vietnamese foreign trade. Section 3 analyzes the impacts of 
the crisis upon Vietnam’s foreign trade in more detail. Section 4 reviews several policy responses 
of the Vietnamese Government. Section 5 discusses some important policy implications for 
Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia.     
   3
2. Overview of the Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on the Vietnamese 
Economy and Literature Review   
Many economists initially insisted that the spillover effects of the US sub-prime mortgage crisis on 
the developing economies in Asia would be limited (Kawai, 2008). For the case of Vietnam, there 
was a reason to believe in this resilience because Vietnam’s financial institutions were less 
exposed to the US sub-prime mortgage and structured financial products in other developed 
economies. Nonetheless, by the mid-2008, all optimism disappeared. The global crisis magnified 
the downturn cycle that Vietnamese economy had been experiencing since the end of 2007.  
After its WTO accession, Vietnam experienced a surge in foreign investment, together with a 
boom in the stock exchange and the real estate sector. Rapid economic growth however became 
overheated, peaking in Q4 of 2007 at the cost of high inflation, which averaged 12.63% for the 
whole year. A contraction phase occurred in Q1 and Q2 of 2008. A soft landing of the economy 
did not happen in 2008, and its prospects were spoiled by the global economic recession.  
Figure 1 shows that the growth rate reached its trough in Q1 of 2009 at 3.14%, before picking up 
gradually to 4.46%, 6.04% and 6.9% in the consecutive quarters. The average economic growth 
rate in 2009 was 5.32% (GSO, 2009). Together with the world economy, the Vietnamese economy 
showed signs of recovery in 2010. The GDP growth rate moved up from 5.83% in Q1 and 6.4% in 
Q2 and 7.18% in Q3 of 2010 compared to the same period of 2009.       
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Source: General Statistics Office, 2010. Monthly Reports.   
The inflation rate increased dramatically in the first half of 2008, reaching above 20% for the 
whole year. The increase in food commodity prices (20% in 2007 and 30% in 2008) contributed to 
the rise in inflation. The economic growth rate also fell from 8.6% in 2007 to 6.2% in 2008. An 
April 2009 study by the Ministry of Labor, Invalid and Social Affairs estimated that some 
400,000-500,000 workers lost their jobs in 2009 as economic growth slowed further (laodong.com, 
9/4/2009).  
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Since as early as the outbreak of the global economic crisis, there have been a series of talks and 
numerous research papers tracing the progress of the crisis and discussing relevant policy 
responses. Most aspects of the crisis, including its impact on world trade, have become hot topics   5
on the academic agenda. The impacts of the crisis on Vietnam’s foreign trade are examined to 
varying degrees in most of works which study the impacts of the crisis on the Vietnamese 
economy and policy responses, recognizing that trade is among the most important impact 
channels. In addition to the description above, the section only listed some important relevant 
works by both foreign and domestic researchers to our knowledge.   
In a broader context, the paper “The Global Economic Crisis and Developing Countries: Impact 
and Response” by Duncan Green, Richard King, and May Miller-Dawkins (2010) discusses the 
impact of the global economic crisis on developing countries and their responses. It focuses on the 
Asia-Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean region. In Asia and the 
Pacific, Vietnam is listed among the countries at lower stages of development. The impact of the 
crisis was in line with that on other countries at the same rank of economic productivity, including 
in the informal economy and at the household level. In the formal economy, there were high levels 
of unemployment, especially in highly extensive export sectors such as textile and garment. In the 
informal economy, home-based workers were laid off prior to permanent employees. Less demand 
for internal migrant workers resulted in less work choice, and thus lower pay for them. To deal 
with escalating food prices and reduced incomes, families tried to cut down on food consumption. 
Some took loans or sold assets to cope. The rural economy is often seen as a sector resilient to 
falling income. However, as the crops shrank and food prices climbed, this form of resilience was 
not particularly effective. 
 
Regarding the literature considered in this review four important points need to be highlighted:   
First, the existing studies attribute the negative impact of the global economic crisis on the 
Vietnamese economy in part to its heavy reliance on exports as the source of growth (Chhibber et 
al, 2009; Bhaskaran and Ghosh, 2010; Pham, 2009; Le, 2009; Nguyen et al, 2010). The magnitude 
of the impact indicates the Vietnamese economy’s level of dependence on global trade. In 
addition, there is a consensus that Vietnam’s export growth declined because of the decline in 
demand from industrialized countries experiencing their own recessions, especially the G3 (USA, 
EU and Japan), which are the main markets for Vietnamese exporters (Le, 2009; Pham, 2009; 
Nguyen et al, 2010). This insight into the “external” dispersion of trading partners is accurate, but 
it is not the whole story concerning the recession in foreign trade. Another explanation can be 
found in the domestic economy.      
Second, a number of authors pointed out that Vietnam had already undergone a year of 
considerable macroeconomic turbulence even before the crisis (Le, 2009; Nguyen et al, 2010). For 
example, in her paper “Vietnam’s policy responses to the financial crisis,” Le Thi Thuy Van 
(2009) pointed out that the Vietnamese economy had been in the midst of macroeconomic 
instability when it was hit by the global financial crisis, causing the economic environment to 
deteriorate further. Domestically, the economy had undergone a period of surging inflation and 
mounting twin deficits in both the fiscal and current accounts in recent years. The external shocks 
then worsened the structural weaknesses of the economy. As domestic consumption weakened and 
export orders decreased, industrial production stagnated and unemployment increased rapidly. The 
crisis thus posed a serious test of the government’s capacity to manage the ailing economy in the 
global downturn.    6
Third, some studies attempt to look into at the trading structure of the domestic economy (Pham 
2009, Nguyen et al, 2010). For example, in a recent paper, Nguyen Ngoc Anh, Nguyen Duc Nhat 
and Nguyen Thang (2010) point out that not only exports but also imports fell dramatically as the 
consequence of the crisis. The reason is that Vietnam’s exports contain a high import component 
of intermediate goods; when exports declined, imports dropped concomitantly in an even greater 
amount. This is true even for sectors where Vietnam is seen as having great advantages in exports 
such as textiles and electronics. The coverage and insights of the majority of those studies however 
are still limited to the extent that they only aim to provide a preliminary analysis without applying 
a specific quantitative model. Further steps thus need to be taken, for example by looking at the 
powerful factors that affect export and import structures and their interrelationships, in order to 
provide policy recommendations for Vietnam in the integration process.    
Fourth, in line with other responses by the developing economies in Asia, enhancing “resilience” 
has been said to be Vietnam’s key priority in the aftermath of the economic crisis. For example, 
Manu Bhaskaran and Ritwick Ghosh (2010) contend that from 2000 to 2008, there was an increase 
in the resiliency of Vietnamese economy thanks to increased domestic demand and an 
improvement in the political and regulatory environment unleashed by the reforms. This positive 
development should be encouraged as part of a continuing policy response in the post-crisis period.  
 
3. Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis on Vietnam’s Foreign Trade 
Overall, although the existing literature may be adequate to help the readers to understand the 
impact of the global crisis on the Vietnamese economy and the policy responses in general, much 
needs to be done with regard to studies of foreign trade which can serve as a theme which cuts 
across all aspects of the process of integration.  
Foreign trade was the most prominent channel in transferring global shocks to Vietnamese 
economy. Figure 4 shows monthly growth rates of exports and imports. Both exports and imports 
began to decline in mid-2008, and they reached their respective bottoms in April 2009 and August 
2009.   
Imports depended heavily on the recovery of domestic demand. Demand was severely impacted by 
high inflation at the beginning of 2008. A decrease in foreign direct investment also contributed to 
a reduction in the demand for imports because foreign companies import the inputs for their 
production. The declining trend only began to reverse in the beginning of 2009 as the government 
implemented several measures to prevent the slowdown of the economy
1 and stimulate the demand 
for imports.  
Vietnamese exports depend heavily on the recovery of the world economy, particularly recovery in 
major trading partners. The growth rate of exports was 0.47% in July 2008 compared to the same 
                                                 
1 i.e. The Government subsidized 4 percentage points of interest on short-term business loans, invested on upgrading 
and constructing infrastructure, and so on.   7
month in 2007, before falling further in the following months
2 and even turning negative at the 
beginning of 2009. The relationship of the global financial crisis with the reduction in exports was 
thus obvious. Compared to imports, the recovery in exports came later because the recovery of the 
world economy also came later than that of domestic economy. The lag in the recovery on imports 
and exports is shown in Figure 4.  






























Export (%) Import (%)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
 
Source: General Statistics Office 
 
Impacts by Country 
It is clear that exports to many major trading partners dropped. Exports to the Australian market 
were hit hardest. Next were Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Singapore.  These are the 
economies which were most negatively affected by the global financial crisis. 
Exports to Korea increased, and exports to China declined slightly.  The Chinese economy was not 
as negatively impacted as other major economies by the crisis, and it quickly recovered. However, 
it is surprising to see an increase in exports to Korea, because the Korean economy was quite 







                                                 
2 i.e. 0.39% in August, 0.29% in September, 0.21% in October, 0.07% in November, and 0.04% in December   8





















Source: General Statistics Office, 2010. 
 
We can clearly see from the chart that imports fell significantly in 2009, including imports from 
major trading partners. However, imports from the Korean economy increased slightly. This 
demonstrates that for the Korean economy, exports and imports are not perfectly elastic with 
respect to income and price. 
 
























Source: General Statistics Office, 2010. 
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Impacts by Commodity 
For several major export products such as garments, footwear and furniture, orders dropped 
quickly, while seafood producers were also under pressure. This reduction in orders caused great 
difficulties to exporters, putting many of them at risk of closing down. Exports of crude oil fell 
sharply, by almost a half in 2009, because of a fall in the global oil price. Coal exports fell by 20% 
in the first 7 months of 2009. According to the Vietnam Textile Association, Vietnam’s garment 
exports, after hitting a record high in 2008, experienced a slowdown in the first half of 2009.
3 The 
fall in export volume of the foreign investment sector was greater than that of the domestic sector 
(15 % compared to 5 %). In contrast, imports in the foreign sector dropped by around 10% 
compared to a fall of 17% in the domestic sector (GSO, 2009). Although the decline may be less 
severe than in some other developing countries, its unexpected magnitude made 2009 the worst 
year for exports since the beginning of Vietnam’s economic reforms (Vietnam Biz Updates 
Weekly, 2009). 
 



























Source: General Statistics Office. 
 
Similar to exports, Vietnamese imports declined quickly for two reasons. First, there was an 
increase in the rate of inflation and a corresponding interest rate hike in 2008 (as part of a 
tightened monetary policy by Vietnamese Government to combat the high inflation rate) that 
adversely impacted both private and state-owned enterprises in the domestic economy. As a result, 
these enterprises cut down their production and reduced their imports. Second, because of a 
decline in demand due to the impact of the global financial crisis and economic slowdown, both 
domestic and foreign-owned enterprises had to reduce their production and imports. 
                                                 
3 In 2008, the U.S was the biggest importer of Vietnam’s garment products (57% of market share), followed by the EU 
(18%), and Japan (9%).    10
It is not surprising that the fall in oil prices led to a decline in oil import values. This was also the 
case for imports of raw materials for textiles and garments because, as mentioned above, the 
exports of the textiles and garments also fell. Car imports also declined during this period of 
economic hardship and uncertainty.  
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Transmission Mechanisms  
a) Slowdown in foreign economies 
As their incomes dropped under the economic distress, consumers in many important trading 
partners of Vietnam such as the United States, Japan, and the EU were forced to cut down their 
expenditures on goods and services, including imported foreign commodities. 
The fall in imported consumption goods from Vietnam, including those with large export volumes 
such as coffee and footwear, was not severe because their elasticity with respect to income is low. 
As a result, the recovery in these goods took place quite quickly. 
However, there was a heavy drop in production goods and raw materials such as rubber and coal 
because of the curtailment of production activities of Vietnam’s major trading partners. 
The recovery in Vietnamese exports occurred in tandem with the economic recovery of Vietnam’s 
major trading partners. Exports of rubber, which were hit hardest, recovered most rapidly, 
followed by other important commodities such as coffee and footwear. Exports of crude oil 
increased slightly because global demand had not fully recovered. 
   11
b) The slowdown of the domestic economy  
 
The fall in imports was also caused by a fall of domestic demand for consumption and industrial 
goods.  
High inflation at the beginning of 2008 forced the State Bank of Vietnam to tighten the money 
supply. Interest rates increased and credit terms were strict. Fiscal policy was also tightened 
accordingly, leading to a decrease in government expenditure. It then became more difficult for 
enterprises to borrow loans from banks and many enterprises had to reduce their production, 
discharge employees or reduce their salaries. 
Starting in mid-2008, while the contractionary monetary policy was still in effect, the economy 
was hit by the adverse shocks of the global financial crisis. Investment, consumption, and 
government expenditure all dropped significantly in 2008 and 2009. The decline in household 
income led to a reduction of consumption of both domestic and imported commodities. For 
example, car imports decreased dramatically in 2009 to just US$59 million, below 2007 levels 
(US$62 million), compared to US$199 million in 2008. They continued to fall in 2010, albeit less 
severely. Imports of motorbikes decreased sharply in 2008 and 2009, but began to increase again 
in 2010. 
Because the import of consumer goods comprises a small part of total import revenue (less than 
10%), a reduction in total imports in 2009 came mainly from a decrease in the import of inputs for 
the production. Imports of gasoline and petroleum dropped most significantly, followed by imports 
of materials for textile and garment production. 
However, as mentioned above, the Vietnamese economic recovery was faster than that of its 
trading partners such as the U.S, Japan, and the EU, and the recovery in imports came earlier than 
that of exports. 
 
c) Reduction in commodity prices 
In 2008, the inflation rate of Vietnam was very high, reaching 23% compared with the previous 
year. The inflation rate of many countries in the world was also at a high level because of the 
increase in the price of oil and many other commodities. Consequently, the prices of several 
commodities (both exported and imported) were high in 2008. 
However, the trend of increasing world commodity prices was suddenly reversed in 2009. Figure 9 
shows that the prices of exports and imports were at highs in 2008 then plunged sharply. This fall 
in prices of exported and imported commodities resulted in a strong reduction in total export and 
import revenues, but did not have a significant impact on the trade deficit. 
 
   12
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Source: General Statistics Office, 2010; and author's calculations. 
 
Figure 10 and Figure 11 indicate that although total export and import revenues (at constant 1994 
prices) increased steadily over the years shown, even in 2009, a decrease in the prices of export 
and import commodities in 2009 resulted in a reduction in total export and import revenues at 
current prices. In 2008, while world prices decreased, Vietnamese exports still increased. 
 
Figure 10. Total export revenue at current prices and at constant 1994 prices over the period 
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Figure 11. Total import revenue at current prices and at constant 1994 price over the period 
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Source: General Statistics Office. 
 
Since 2008, the nominal exchange rate has increased. Although this policy was able to stimulate 
exports and discourage imports (see Figure 12), it also demonstrates the inherent macro-instability 
of the economy with regard to exchange rates and confidence in the VND.  
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d) Protectionism 
At the outbreak of the global financial crisis and the subsequent recession, many of Vietnam’s 
trading partners deployed protectionist measures, and these adversely affected exports in a number 
of important products. In 2009, the number of antidumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard lawsuits 
against Vietnam reached a record high of 42 cases.  
Vietnamese exporters are currently very vulnerable to such lawsuits because some major trading 
partners still refuse to recognize Vietnam as a market economy. Following the U.S shrimp case, in 
December 2009, the European Community also decided to extend its anti-dumping tariff on 
leather-capped shoes imported from Vietnam for 15 months. Unfortunately, the commodities with 
largest export revenues such as textiles, leather products, milled paper, and plastic products are 
also the most likely to be faced with lawsuits.     
 
4. Policy Responses 
During this difficult time, the VND/USD exchange rate increased from 16,600:1 in Q3 of 2008 to 
18,479:1 in Q4 of 2009 (GSO, 2009), with the VND losing almost 11% of its value against the US 
dollar. However, these official figures were below those in the free market, where the rate had 
passed the 19,000 threshold. The further decline in the exchange rate exaggerated the negative 
impacts of global shocks on the Vietnamese economy and disturbed trading behavior by triggering 
a massive wave of speculation in the US dollar and an artificial shortage of this currency for 
importers.  
The global economic crisis contributed to the expansion of Vietnam’s chronic trade deficit, the 
growth rate of which has remained around 15% per year since 2000 (MUTRAP III, 2009: 16). In 
2008, the trade deficit reached a record high of US$ 18 billion (ADB, 2009), or almost 32.1% of 
GDP. The trade deficit averaged US$ 2.2 billion per month in the first 5 months of 2008. In 2009, 
the trade deficit was reduced to US$ 12.2 billion, which was still at a level of 20.8% of GDP 
(GSO, 2009).   
Monetary policy, led by the manipulation of interest rates and foreign exchange rates, was the first 
line of defense against the impacts of the crisis for the economy, including the trading sector. 
 
Interest rate policies:  
With the global economic downturn and the precipitous drop in oil and other commodity prices, 
inflation pressure, which was still high in late July of 2008, gradually dissipated. This gave the 
SBV greater room to reduce rates to support sagging production activities, including those by 
importers and exporters. Policies were quickly adjusted in tandem with the rapid changes in the 
market. The following is the brief chronology of some relevant events:     15
  February – June 2008: The base interest rate was brought up from 8.25% to 14% to 
cope with the inflation, pushing the deposit rates and lending rates of commercial 
banks up to their peaks at 17-18% and 20-21% respectively in August-early 
September.  
  September 2008: With inflation easing, the SBV increased the required reserve rate 
for commercial banks from 3.6% to 5% to help reduce lending rates.  
  1 February 2009: The base interest rate was cut to 7%. 
  1 March 2009: The SBV reduced the required reserve ratio for VND deposits 
(demand deposits and savings deposits) from 5% to 3%. The ratio for deposits 
longer than 12 months was 1%. 
  1 December 2009: The base interest rate increased from 7% to 8% (the 
recapitalization interest rate from 7% to 8%, and the discount rate from 5% to 6%). 
The aim was to control the quality of credit by commercial banks and coordinate 
interest rates with exchange rate policy.   
 
Exchange rate policy:  
Although the VND had long been pegged to the US dollar, starting in mid-2008, the SBV took 
steps toward a more flexible exchange rate mechanism to reduce devaluation pressure on the 
VND:    
  27 June 2008: The exchange rate trading band increased to 2% from 1%. 
  7 November 2008: The band increased to 3 % from 2 %. 
  24 March 2009: The band was extended to 5% from 3%. 
  26 November 2009: The interbank exchange rate band increased by 5.44% (at the 
same time, the US/VND exchange band was narrowed to 3% from 5%), thus 
increasing the exchange rate ceiling by 3.44% (at 18,500 VND per USD). 
The fluctuation of exchange rates in recent months and the imbalance between foreign currency 
supply and demand has led to massive wave of speculation and shown that the exchange rate is 
still the Achilles’ heel of the Vietnamese economy and a big risk to traders.    16
Fiscal measures were the next line of defense. In January 2009, the Vietnamese government 
announced the first stimulus package, in the amount of US$ 1 billion. The package proposed a 4% 
interest rate subsidy for businesses and individuals over a period of 8 months, ending on December 
31
st, 2009. In May 2009, the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) announced the second 
stimulus package of VND 143,000 billion (US$ 8 billion or 8.3% of GDP) to further spur growth 
amid the deepening global recession. The second package has eight components:  
  Supporting low-interest credit loans (about VND 17,000 billion);  
  Disbursement of basic construction investment capital to be provided in advance 
(approximately VND 3,400 billion),  
  Spending on the state budget account to complete certain urgent projects (about 
VND 37,200 billion);  
  Transferring plan investment capital from 2008 to 2009 (about VND 30,200 
billion),  
  Issuing more Government bonds (around VND 20,000 billion);  
  Tax reduction (approximately VND 28,000 billion);  
  Increasing outstanding debt in the form of credit guarantees for enterprises (about 
VND 17,000 billion); and  
  Other expenses to stimulate demand aiming at stopping the economic recession and  
ensuring social security (VND 7,200 billion) (Vn.economy.vn, 13/5/2009).  
  In general, the stimulus policies implemented since 2008 have helped boost exports. 
Below are some examples of measures targeted at enterprises:  
  Since 1 January 2009: reduced corporate tax rate (from 28% to 25%). 
  Since 23 January 2009: VND-dominated loans at a subsidized interest rate of 4% 
interest, disbursed during 2009 with a maximum duration of 8 months.  
  In Q4 of 2008 and all of 2009: reduction of corporate tax by 30% for small and 
medium enterprises. 
  Reducing of VAT by half for 19 groups of products and services in 2009, including 
materials and machines for production and export. 
  From 15 February 2009: reduction of export duties for several commodities (such 
as fossil coal) to 10% from the existing level of 20%. 
  From 29 March 2009: extending the payment period for corporate taxes on 
mechanical products, construction materials (such as brick, tile, lime, and paint), 
installation services, tourism, food businesses, and fertilizer for a period of 9 
months. 
  Guaranteeing working capital loans to enterprises (Decision 14/2009/QĐ-TTg)  
  From 1 April 2009 to 31 December 2011: a subsidized 4% annual interest rate for 
enterprises, applied to medium and long term loans and disbursed from 1/4/ 2009 - 
31/12/2009 for a maximum period of 24 months.    17
Thus, the stimulus package covers a wide range of incentives provided to export industries. It not 
only seeks to assist exporters in general (such as by reduction of corporate taxes and interest rate 
subsidies) but also to promote the export of specific commodities and services (such as the 
reduction of export duties). In addition, the depreciation of the VND has also played an important 
role in boosting exports.  
Nonetheless, those policies have not been very helpful in reducing the mounting trade deficit. 
Under the backdrop of the global crisis, although both export revenue (US$ 56.6 billion) and 
import revenue (US$ 68.8 billion) dropped in 2009 (9.7% and 10.8% respectively compared to 
2008 figures), the trade deficit still equaled 21.5% of total export revenue (GSO, 2009). This is due 
the fact that a large proportion of the inputs for export goods are imported. Vietnamese export 
products have very low added value, even those seen as competitive in the global market such as 
garments, textiles, and tea. 
Moreover, the depreciation of the VND has been a major concern for Vietnam’s export 
competitors in the region, including neighboring countries such as Thailand, Cambodia and Lao 
PDR, since they export many of the same commodities. These include garments, textiles, tea, rice 
and other agricultural and aquacultural products.   
Additionally, the existing policy mostly focuses on trade in manufactured products and services 
but little on agricultural trade. For instance, there are subsidies and tariff reductions on imported 
inputs, but no corresponding support for agriculture. This is understandable given that a number of 
Vietnamese agricultural and aquacultural products are subject to antidumping lawsuits from 
trading partners. Fortunately, as a WTO member, Vietnam has a major advantage in that it may 
take those cases to the WTO dispute settlement body and in so doing reduce the arbitrary 
imposition of trade barriers by foreign partners. The dispute over shrimp exports to the U.S. is such 
a case.     
 
5. Discussion of Policy Implications  
The policy responses of Vietnam have important implications for Cambodia and Lao PDR. Similar 
to Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao PDR have adopted monetary and fiscal policies to blunt the impact 
of the global crisis on their foreign trade.  
The initial reaction by the Cambodian government was to increase the reserve requirements of 
commercial banks from 8% to 16%, but it was later reduced to 12% once inflation conditions 
permitted some room for monetary easing. To prevent bad investments, the government also 
limited banks’ exposure to high-risk sectors, specifically real estate, by introducing a 15% cap on 
real estate lending (Hoang, 2009: 7). 
The vulnerability of lower-income economies in the GMS such as Lao PDR, Cambodia and 
Vietnam to external shocks highlights the importance of exchange rate management choices in 
contributing to macroeconomic and financial stability. This requires prudent capital account 
openness and consideration of the sequence of capital market liberalization in order to ensure   18
relatively stable exchange rates. Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam are currently more or less 
under managed floating foreign exchange regimes. 
Stimulus packages have also been adopted and have proved able to produce quick results in the 
Lao and Cambodian economies. During its 6
th ordinary session in December 2008, the 6
th 
Legislature of the Lao National Assembly approved additional funding for the government, 
increasing its budget for 2008-2009 from 10,026 billion Kip to 10,648 billion Kip. While the 
additional money was originally for the purpose of helping the country recover from damage 
caused by severe flooding in September 2008, it also had important demand-side leverage effects. 
In addition, the Asian Development Bank also pledged to increase its financial assistance to Lao 
PDR over the following two years to help the country mitigate the impacts of the global financial 
crisis and enable its economy to recover. In 2008, the ADB provided Lao PDR a total of US$ 53 
million in assistance which was mainly used to fund Laos’ poverty reduction projects in rural 
areas. For 2009, the Bank allocated US$ 89 million to fund five important projects: improving the 
quality of higher education, developing public health services, improving the production efficiency 
of small and medium businesses, developing and improving transportation and communication 
links between northern areas of Lao PDR and neighboring GMS countries, and providing technical 
assistance to the Lao administration (VOA News, 8/1/2009). In addition, stimulus effects also 
came from investment on projects related to the South-East Asia Games that Lao PDR hosted in 
2009. 
In December 2008, Cambodian lawmakers passed a US$ 1.8 billion budget for 2009, increasing 
spending by a third compared to the US$ 1.37 billion 2008 budget. The budget was passed after 
donor countries pledged US$ 950 million in aid, almost 40% more than they offered in 2008. 
However, the government was under pressure to have a stimulus package following what was done 
worldwide and in neighboring countries. In January 2009, opposition leader Sam Rainsy proposed 
a US$ 500 million stimulus package in order to help the Cambodian economy overcome the 
economic recession. The money would go to stabilizing crop prices and the construction of 
irrigation and road networks. Although the government criticized the proposed budget as excessive 
given the limited budget, it said that it would extend tax breaks for clothing manufacturers and 
invest in power plants as a cash shortage restricted its ability to provide economic stimulus. 
According to Finance Minister Keath Chhon, the government already subsidized electricity by 
US$300 million in 2008 and the fiber industry by US$450 million, while total intervention 
accounted for 4.9% of Cambodia’s GDP.   
Responses to the global crisis in foreign trade by lower-income economies in the GMS such as Lao 
PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam share important policy dimensions, especially in terms of sub-
regional cooperation.  
First, like other developing Asian economies, the economies of Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia 
rely too much on exports and foreign investment as the sources of growth. There was a remarkably 
synchronized contraction in trade and investment across these countries, which was generally 
consistent with their position in global and regional production networks. This kind of 
vulnerability was even greater for such economies as Vietnam and Cambodia, which have recently 
become WTO members. Although trade with neighboring economies is very important (especially   19
for countries with geographical disadvantages such as Lao PDR), it has been either inadequately 
promoted or improperly exploited by the private sector, perhaps due to the prevalence of 
smuggling.  
Second, there has been congruence and synergy in policy responses as these countries adopted 
monetary and fiscal measures. These policies were quite successful, but they were still limited by 
their largely national, independent, and uncoordinated characters, given that the GMS economies 
are increasingly interdependent with each other in trade, investment, and finance. Indeed, there has 
been a “stimulus pressure” upon smaller countries with limited budgets such as Lao PDR and 
Cambodia who can not afford to compete with Thailand and Vietnam in terms of stimulus package 
size. However, fiscal policy stimulus can have a positive spillover effect on the neighboring 
countries through trade. Although this is to the benefit of smaller economies, these smaller 
economies should not see this as an incentive to “free ride” since this would lead to a smaller than 
desirable fiscal stimulus.  
Third, although the risk of defection is always high in such moments of difficulty, lower-income 
GMS economies have not pursued beggar-thy-neighbor policies. They have not taken aggressive 
moves to encourage exports such as sharp currency devaluations, the provision of favorable tax 
treatment for exports, or raising tariffs to protect domestic industries by discouraging imports.   
Finally, in their responses to the global recession, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam should look 
at ways to rebalance their growth. That means they must become a market for their own domestic 
production. The ultimate objective of growth rebalancing is not to restore the current account 
balance (Kawai, 2009). Export-led growth of such market-oriented economies such as those in the 
GMS may result in surpluses or deficits, but this trend must be justified by an appropriate foreign 
trade structure and the advancement of those economies’ positions in the global value chain. Also, 
rebalancing should proceed by removing impediments to domestic consumption by increasing the 
purchasing power of consumers and their opportunities to access cheaper domestic commodities.   
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Appendix 1: 
 
Direction of Trade   (million US Dollars; calendar year) and annual rates of change 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Exports, total  32 447.1 39 826  48 561  61 180  57 096.3 
  22.74  21.93  25.99  -6.67 
1. United States  5924.0 7845 10089  12594  11355.8 
  32.43  28.60  24.83  -9.83 
2. Japan  4340.3 5240 6070 8264  6291.8 
  20.73  15.84  36.14  -23.86 
3. China, People's Republic of  3228.1 3243 3357 4174  4909.0 
  0.46  3.52  24.34  17.61 
4. Australia  2722.8 3745 3557 4957  2276.7 
  37.54  -5.02  39.36  -54.07 
5. Singapore  1917.0 1812 2202 2314  2076.3 
  -5.48  21.52  5.09  -10.27 
6. Germany  1085.5 1445 1855 2715  1885.4 
  33.12  28.37  46.36  -30.56 
7. United Kingdom  1015.8 1180 1431 1679  1329.2 
  16.16  21.27  17.33  -20.83 
8. Malaysia  1028.3 1254 1390 1606  1681.6 
  21.95  10.85  15.54  4.71 
9. Korea, Republic of  663.6 843 1253  1430  2064.5 
  27.03  48.64  14.13  44.37 
10. Thailand  863.0 930 1034  1244  1266.1 
  7.76  11.18  20.31  1.78 
 
Source: GSO, 2009.    23
Appendix 2: 
 
Direction of Trade   (million US Dollars; calendar year) and annual rates of change 
 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Imports, total  36 761.1 44 891  62 682  82 954  69 948.8 
  22.12  39.63  32.34  -15.68 
1. China, People's Republic of  5899.7 7391 12502  17593  16441.0 
  25.28  69.15  40.72  -6.55 
2. Singapore  4482.3 6274 7609  10085  4248.4 
  39.97  21.28  32.54  -57.87 
3. Japan  4074.1 4702 6178 8615  7468.1 
  15.41  31.39  39.45  -13.31 
4. Korea, Republic of  3594.1 3908 5334 6090  6976.4 
  8.73  36.49  14.17  14.56 
5. Thailand  2374.1 3034 3737 5459  4514.1 
  27.80  23.17  46.08  -17.31 
6. Malaysia  1256.5 1482 2290 2747  2504.7 
  17.95  54.52  19.96  -8.82 
7. Hong Kong, China  1235.0 1441 1941 2927 825.6 
  16.68  34.70  50.80  -71.79 
8. United States  862.9 987 1700  3069  3009.4 
  14.38  72.24  80.53  -1.94 
9. Indonesia  700.0 1013 1354 1780  1546.1 
  44.71  33.66  31.46  -13.14 
10. Germany  661.9 915 1309  1612  1587.3 
   38.24  43.06  23.15  -1.53 
 








   2007 2008 2009 2010
Export (%)             
Coal  18.36 43.04 -3.96 28.51
Rice  2.69 132.43 61.02 12.34
Crude oil   2.29 32.75 -36.01 -18.68
Coffee   56.77 28.12 -17.81 9.07
Pepper    61.84 25.13 13.94 34.87 
Rubber   17.90 27.86 -32.30 91.36
Cashew nut   25.22 41.44 -7.34 31.48
Tea   24.72 29.60 15.52 17.49
Footware   13.77 14.26 -13.70 23.45
Textile   34.97 20.05 -6.15 24.43
Aquaculture product   16.27 20.71 -6.52 8.69
Electronic, computer   23.81 23.24 1.54 23.09
              
Import (%)             
Mechanic instruments   62.12 45.34 -8.90 10.07
Gas and petrol   14.46 57.93 -42.01 16.27
Inputs for textile and leather  9.24 9.66 -19.27 33.38
Steel   54.38 34.71 10.75 15.90
Fertilizer   35.92 86.79 7.08 23.33
Medicine   31.62 19.18 28.14 28.87
Plastic   39.80 18.76 3.50 35.15
Textile fiber   41.79 27.77 0.11 44.05
Motorbike   76.66 1.46 -5.70 25.60
Cloth   31.19 18.24 0.25 24.17
Cars   62.10 199.64 59.46 34.89
 
 
 